Gods Omnipotence Essay Example

Gods Omnipotence Essay Example Gods Omnipotence Essay Gods Omnipotence Essay Some people refer God as the Omnipotent, that is to say a being that has unlimited power, and is able to do everything. God has four different attributes, he is omniscient, simple, eternal and omnipotent. The latter raises some difficulties, and paradoxes. In a first part I will show how omnipotence can be defined differently, how radical omnipotence differs with limited omnipotence and the issue with logic. Then I will show how God’s omnipotence raises some paradoxes and contradictions, by relying on the paradox of the stone and the problem of evil. Finally I will try to answer some questions concerning God’s ability to sin, to bring about the past, and to do things not done by him. Does God’s powers have a limit, could it then be possible that God’s omnipotence isn’t logic ? The concept of omnipotence and God is not that easily understood. Indeed many philosophers have different conceptions of God’s extent of power. Omnipotence is a kind of supremacy, all-powerfulness. Following that definition, the omnipotence of God   is an absolute, and radical one. This is Descartes’ view, according to him God can do the logically possible as well as the logically impossible, he can make a square circle and change the laws of mathematics. Indeed, ‘God can do whatever we are able to understand, but not that He cannot do what we are unable to understand. For it would be presumptuous to think that our imagination extends as far as His power’ (Descartes,   1630). In other words, it is for us Humans impossible to imagine and understand a notion as illogical as a square circle, however God created everything, and that includes logic. : Therefore it is for him perfectly possible and coherent to draw a square circle, or make the number 2 higher than the number 9. However Aquinas claims that ‘this phrase, God can do all things, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible’ (Peterson, 2001, p. 124). The definition of omnipotence being God is able to do everything, is now limited to God can do everything that is possible. And by everything that is possible, Aquinas means everything that is logically possible. As a result it is incoherent for God to draw a square circle. However his inability to do so does not prevent God from being omnipotent ‘it does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence’ (ibid, p. 125), indeed this self contradictory phrase represents a ‘non-question’. Richard Swinburne has the same position as Aquinas and argues that ‘ a logically impossible is not an action. It is what is described by a form of words which purport to describe an action, but do not describe anything which it is coherent to suppose could be done’(Swinburne, 1993, p. 153). Therefore it would not be coherent to construct a spherical cube, as it is only two words put together   which does not represent anything. Moreover Swinburne believes that certain actions are logical, such as getting married, but they become logically impossible when they are performed by a certain kind of people, for instance : get married to a bachelor. So the action itself is not considered logically impossible, but it is the combination of the person and the situation, that makes it logically impossible. So being omnipotent is not only being possible to do everything logically possible but is an â€Å"ability to bring about any logically possible state of affairs† (Swinburne, 1993, p. 150). According to this view, God’s omnipotence is a coherent idea. Can God create a stone heavier that he can lift ? Considering that God is omnipotent, he is able to create such a stone, however he is not able to lift it. If he cannot lift it, then he is not omnipotent This act seems illogical and self-contradictory, Mavrodes states that such acts are ‘pseudo-tasks’, ‘the fact that they cannot be performed implies no limits on the power of god’(Mavrodes, 2005, p. 262), but as Aquinas pointed out, the act of lifting this stone requires an illogical power, therefore God cannot lift it as he is able to do everything that is logically coherent. But it does not derive him from being omnipotent. Moreover if God is radically omnipotent, he is not bound by logical laws, therefore the illogical act of creating the stone is possible, consequently the illogical act of lifting it is possible as well. We can also imagine that t1 is the time when God creates the stone, and t2 the time he lifts it. At t1, God’s omnipotence allows him to create the stone, then the stone being created he can lift it at t2. Indeed Mavrodes (2005) argues that ‘nothing in the argument required the theologian to admit any limit on God’s power with regard to the lifting of the stones And if God’s power to lift is infinite, then his power to create may run to infinity also without outstripping the first power’(Mavrodes, 2005, p119). In other words those two actions are successively possible, as God’s power is infinite in both cases. Yet some would argue that in t2 the stone still cannot be lifted by God as he created it being this way. The paradox of the stone shows that there is an incoherence concerning God and omnipotence. There has to be some limits to his power. But where do those limits extend? As well as being omnipotent, God is morally good and benevolent. How could there be evil in the world if God is omnipotent, his power should prevent any existence of evil as he is morally good. Those attributes combined should eliminate evil. Yet, everyday we witness evil. To understand the presence of evil in the world one has to either admit that God is not omnipotent, or that his omnipotence is incoherent ; or admit that he is not benevolent. However it can be argued that for good to exist, evil has to exist and that it would be illogical to think that good could exist on its own. (Mackie, 1955)The claim that ‘evil is necessary as a counterpart to good’ (Mackie, 1955, p. 03) errs, indeed we can again assert that as God made the laws of logic it would be possible for only good to exist in the world. Nevertheless the existence of evil in the world is required to prove what good really is. Without evil, everything, every actions are considered good. But if good is everywhere, it becomes difficult to measure it, and we cannot compare i t with other actions. To be good is to possess and display moral virtue, but how can we do that if evil does not exist ? Good has to be opposed to evil, for it to exist. It then does not distract it with God’s omnipotence. Mackie (1955) reckons that first order evil such as ‘pain and misery’ contrasts with first order good ‘pleasure and happiness’. Moreover a second order good such as ‘sympathy’ can only exist if there is a second order evil ‘suffering’, similarly with ‘heroism in facing danger’ (Mackie, 1955, p. 206). But according to Mackie this claim fails, in fact the second order evil that is ‘cowardice’ or ‘cruelty’ (Mackie, 1955, p. 207) is rising as much as another second order good. And if God were omnipotent and morally good he would try and eliminate those evils. Regarding evil and omnipotence many philosophers have taken the position that human have freewill and are independent of God. And that would explain why there is evil and how god remains omnipotent. Freedom is considered as good for the society and humans. If humans were not free, it would undermine god’s morally good attribute. Thus it is logic for him to create humans who are free. Yet Mackie (1955) argues that if God could create humans who are free to choose between evil and good, he could therefore help them into choosing what is good. However this view can be reconsidered, in fact it would be an illogical action to create free agents and then to force them to always lean towards what is good. Besides Swinburne (1993) insists on how the creation of a world where humans are forced to act a certain way would deprive humans of fulfilling themselves, and benefiting from interactions with each other. According to the thinker a ‘A good God, like a good father, will delegate responsibility. In order to allow creatures to share in creation, he will allow them the choice of hurting and maiming, or frustrating the divine plan. ’(1993, p. 1) Thus human freewill does not detract God from his omnipotence, but it limits it. Indeed, God is benevolent so freedom has to exist in order for humans to experience and learn from their consequences. As Swinburne puts it ‘as parents we regard it as a good thing that our children have power to do free actions of moral significance even if the consequence is that they som etimes do evil actions. ’ (1993, p. 76) The relationship between omnipotence and benevolence clashes once again when we wonder if God is able to sin. Indeed, God is able to do everything, therefore he should be able to sin. But God is morally good, so he cannot sin. Therefore God is not omnipotent. However it is not logically possible for God to sin and to be omnipotent, and according to Aquinas this is a non-question, it does not derive God from his omnipotence. Besides God is a perfect being, he cannot allow anything that would cause and imply any imperfection of his being. We can assert that it is god’s omnipotence that prevents him from sinning ‘to sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is the be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence’ (Aquinas, 2001, p. 125). Yet, one can argue that God is able to sin but chooses not to. Indeed how could God be morally good if he does not have the choice to sin ? The fact that he is able to sin but chooses not to makes him benevolent, and does not derive him from his omnipotence. Finally, we can raise two problems concerning god’s omnipotence. Is he able to bring about the past ? Is he able to do things not done by god ? According to Aquinas God can affect actions before they are performed, for instance he can decide for Socrates not to run before he has ran ‘therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run’(Aquinas, 1265-1274). However Aquinas points out that Socrates cannot be sitting, and not sitting at the same moment, consequently it is self contradictory to say that Socrates sat and did not sit. It is highly illogical and it ‘does not fall under the scope of God’s omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction’. (Ibid)   If we consider (1) ‘There is a table which has not been made by an omnipotent being’, can we say that this table has been created by God ? If God could not create this table he is not omnipotent. However God could have possibly created that table, then maybe God is omnipotent. Van der Brink, 1994). Aquinas claims that ‘His will is the cause of all things ; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things’ (1265-1274) in other words God is able to do things not done by him considering that he made everything, ‘the determinist might reply that anyone who makes anything determines its ways of acting, and so determines its subsequent behaviour’ (Mackie, 1955, p. 211). This makes it clear that God can do things that non omnipotent beings do. God’s omnipotence is confronted to many contradictions and paradoxes. But does it make it incoherent? I trust that God’s omnipotence is coherent. Indeed I believe that God can create a square circle, a stone heavier that he can lift, and he can do things not done by him, as he created the laws of logic. However when concerning human beings, I believe that God is bound by logical laws but it does not derive him from his omnipotence. Indeed, as Swinburne (1993) stated, it would be impossible for someone to marry a bachelor, it is self contradictory, besides it logically impossible for God to bring about the past. Furthermore, as evil is necessary for the notion of good to exist and God is able to sin but chooses not to, I assume that God can be omnipotent and benevolent. It can be assumed that an omnipotent being is not someone who does everything because he is all powerful, in fact ‘a being may remain omnipotent for ever because he never exercises his power to create stones too heavy to lift forces too strong to resist or universes too wayward to control’ (Swinburne, 1993, p161).